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"Keep the Party Assured and the Youth [not] Satisfied":  The Communist Youth 
League and Chinese University Students 
 
Abstract: The Communist Youth League (CYL) has attempted to engage and 
respond to student interests and demands by expanding its channels for participation, 
consultation and by deepening its involvement in welfare services provision. Based 
on qualitative and quantitative research conducted in five universities in Beijing and 
Zhejiang province, the paper will evaluate the League’s engagement with its 
‘constituency’ on campus by bringing together the perspectives of both ordinary 
students and CYL cadres. Placing this case in a wider discussion on ‘authoritarian 
resilience’ that seeks to understand the effectiveness of the Chinese regime’s 
institutional sources of support, the paper will demonstrate that despite initiatives 
promoting responsiveness, students exhibit an even more cynical stance to both the 
League’s newfound inclusivity and efficiency. CYL cadres occupy weak positions in 
the academic, generational and political hierarchies on campus, a situation that 
compromises the League’s potential for a renewed and more responsive engagement 
with students. 
 




The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s attempt to lead a rapidly changing 
society without losing its monopoly on power has created enormous pressure on its 
institutions to adapt. As the regime keeps the core of its political system closed to the 
prospect of liberalization, social pressure for responsiveness has become more 
intensive in the periphery, and especially to those government and party institutions 
that are located at the forefront of state and society relations. Chinese citizens in 
general are outspoken and demanding, while their loyalty to the regime is more 
conditional than ever, largely depending on the ability of state institutions to offer 
meaningful and effective responses to their current problems and demands.  
The loyalty of Chinese university students in particular constitutes a 
continuous challenge for the regime. Students are an integral part of economic 
reforms as the architects, engineers, economists, doctors, researchers etc. of the 
future. Perhaps more importantly, they are the social group from which the new 
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middle class and socioeconomic elite will emerge. Therefore it is of no surprise that 
the regime’s relation with university students has attracted scholarly attention. 
Existing research has focused on nationalistic propaganda, material incentives and 
control mechanisms that the Party uses to shape student attitudes in a favourable 
manner to its rule. This body of scholarly work agrees that some combination of 
increased career opportunities for graduates and authoritarian practices 
(indoctrination, control, fear of coercion) have tamed, for the time being, this 
historically important force in Chinese politics by either convincing students on the 
necessity of the current political arrangement or by leading them to political apathy 
(Liu, 1996; Chan, 2000; Rosen, 2004; Yan, 2014). This is a causal explanation that 
also reads as a self-evident proposition. Either way, its negation has been silently 
postponed until the next round of student protests. 
Although it is not possible to predict exactly what will drive students to the 
streets and when, both Chinese history and the experience of authoritarian regimes 
elsewhere renders highly unlikely that students will be absent from future contentious 
politics in the PRC.  The Chinese regime is aware of that and has accordingly 
assigned its main youth organization, the Communist Youth League (CYL, the 
League), with the task of “keeping the party assured [and] the youth satisfied” (让党
放心让青年满意). Perhaps it is hard to think of a more laconic articulation of the 
challenge ahead. Cultivating legitimacy for the Party requires the League’s 
engagement with the needs and demands of its “constituency” of young people in 
general and particularly students, and the augmentation of its capacity for 
responsiveness. In order to achieve that the League needs to expand its work beyond 
its traditional tasks of indoctrinating, mobilizing, and preparing young people for 
Party membership, and moderate its formal and bureaucratic outlook and processes to 
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allow for meaningful participation. The call for a more responsive, youth-oriented, 
inclusive mode of work is repeated in various youth and League-related publications, 
and has also entered official Party discourse. 
This article will examine the CYL-student interaction on campus in the 
context of the academic investigation on the institutional pillars of China’s 
‘authoritarian resilience’. Considering explanations that focus on economic 
performance, nationalist propaganda, and the fear of coercion as insufficient for 
understanding the stability of the Chinese regime, Nathan (2003) called for a more 
systematic approach to the role of CCP institutions in the centre (for example regular 
leadership succession) and the periphery (village elections, consultative channels), in 
a) decreasing uncertainty in the political process, and b) in providing safety valves 
that can ‘absorb’ the social pressures created by the rapid transformation of economy 
and society.  As the ability of the regime to control uncertainty is by definition 
limited, examining the performance of the main institution in charge of managing the 
relationship between university students and the CCP is more topical and analytically 
important than ever.  
Of course, the Party has also other mechanisms to co-opt students and sustain 
their tolerance to its rule; the prospect of a career and economic advancement, 
preferential access to CCP membership, the nationalistic justification of 
authoritarianism through propaganda, surveillance, and the underlying threat of 
coercion. But as Teresa Wright (2010: 176) has noted, citizens below 30 years old (in 
2010, 43 percent of population and 20 percent of adults) have no memory of poverty 
and hardship in the socialist era, and take fast economic growth and material 
abundance for granted. As a result, appealing to economic development to enhance 
popular acceptance of the CCP’s rule may become a less convincing narrative, 
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especially as China experiences an economic slowdown (176-7). Likewise, as the 
reformist regime’s commitment to secure employment has long been abandoned, the 
League cannot offer a loyalty-for-career trade-off, at least not at a mass scale. 
Individual cadres may pursue the League path to a future career in the Party-state but 
this is of little relevance to the many who enter an increasingly competitive job 
market every year. Similarly, nationalism is actively cultivated within the educational 
system (Zheng, 2012) but often young people have more demanding and critical 
attitudes on nationalistic grounds than the government is willing to accept, causing 
tensions and the latter’s embarrassment. Lastly, coercion is an important element of 
authoritarian rule, but it has to be tactical, not ubiquitous, to avoid mass justification 
of violent resistance. In order to limit reliance on such uncertain factors, the CCP has 
directed the CYL to increase its engagement with students and provide channels for 
feedback and responsiveness (Yang, 2009; Li, 2010). With the above in mind, a set of 
questions arises: does the League provide an institutional ‘safety valve’ for the 
Chinese regime, thereby reducing its exposure to uncertainty? Is the League effective 
in building support by responding to student demands, and by providing incentives to 
remain engaged with formal political channels? Historically, its ability to do so has 
been very limited. 
 
Students and the League: an uneasy relationship 
 
The very few investigations of the CYL surround the Cultural Revolution 
(CR) and the student protests of the second half of the 1980s. In both cases, scholars 
reported the CYL’s systematic lack of responsiveness and failure to appeal to its 
constituency. Early research on the CYL shows that soon after 1949, the League 
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transformed into a sluggish bureaucracy resembling little of a revolutionary 
movement but for symbols and rhetoric (Barnett, 1952; Chao, 1954; Pringsheim, 
1962). The CYL “socialized China’s young people to the wrong things” (Montaperto, 
1977: 255-8) consistently failing in its representational function (Healy, 1982: 112). 
John Israel (1967: 4) attributes the League’s fall during the Cultural Revolution to its 
conservative stance as a party bureaucracy that led radicalized youths to form the Red 
Guards outside the League. The League appeared as an organization of “little 
specially privileged persons” (Chou Weiling, 1975:52), which was too close to the 
Party to “respond dynamically to changing political conditions” (Funnell, 1970: 127).  
On the contrary, the most radical Red Guards had “bad class” background, which 
disqualified them from enjoying the special privileges of those with political 
affiliations in the League and the Party (Blecher and White, 1979: 81; Rosen, 1982: 
147; White, 1989: 46-47). Although recent research has contested the view that class 
background neatly divided conservative from radical groups (Walder, 2009), the 
CYL’s position as part of the CCP establishment sealed its fate for that period. It only 
re-emerged as part of the Party effort to reclaim control in the early 1970s (Chou, 
1973).  
In the 1980s, surveys on student political attitudes revealed a high degree of 
disassociation with the Party (Liu, 1984; Rosen 1987). Party and CYL officials 
reported a significant decline in recruitment, accompanied by cynicism and “satirical 
attitudes” towards CCP membership (Liu, 1984: 88), which created a sense of crisis 
and a lack of direction for cadres (Rosen, 1987: 3). Thomas Gold (1996: 186-9) noted 
the regime’s contradictory demands to League cadres, who were called to observe 
collectivist ideals in a social environment that revered individualism, consumerism 
and wealth. Cadres neglected political duties and engaged instead in social activities, 
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parties and outings (Gold, 1996: 191). Jeffrey Wasserstom and Liu Xinyong (1995: 
383-4) showed how campus life in the 1980s provided the organizational groundwork 
for the 1989 protests as CYL cadres participated in unofficial ‘salons’, societies and 
groups. Stanley Rosen concluded that the “real threat” for the CCP was previously 
“committed student cadres who found officially sanctioned organizations irrelevant 
and therefore created new ones” (Rosen, 1992:188). Indeed, many League cadres 
were at the forefront of the student movement. 
The systematic lack of responsiveness and failure to appeal to its constituency 
is the major characteristic of the League’s relation with students until 1989. After 
Tiananmen, the already limited academic interest on the CYL almost disappeared. 
The few studies that made some reference to the League pointed out that young 
generations are clearly “success oriented”, openly seeking the “good life” (Liu, 1996: 
171; Rosen, 2004: 159), and have very “pragmatic” political attitudes (Chan, 2000). 
CYL surveys support what has been argued in qualitative terms, namely that students 
express a very low belief in communist ideals and have rather instrumental attitudes 
in deciding to acquire political affiliation (Rosen, 2004: 161-170). Yan Xiaojun 
(2014), examined the League as part of the CCP’s control apparatus on campus, 
which aims at preventing student mobilization through surveillance, political rituals 
and material incentives that promote “careerism” and “apoliticism”. He concludes that 
political apathy has become prevalent among Chinese students and the League’s main 
role is to cultivate political conformity rather than “ideological devotion and zeal” 
(Yan, 2014: 511). However, the League has not escaped the regime’s emphasis on 
responsiveness that characterized institutional developments, especially in the Hu-
Wen era. This attempt to “keep the youth satisfied” remains largely unexplored. 
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Responsiveness and cadre agency 
 
Can the top-down introduction of a new mandate for responsiveness improve 
the performance of Party organizations? Responsiveness does not only require 
accurate information on social conditions and a mandate to act accordingly, but also 
appropriate incentives and training, specific goals and expectations, as well as suitable 
norms and methods of work that enable cadres to carry out their new tasks.  
Expanding a mandate without empowering the people who are going to carry it out 
will at best produce limited and reversible results. The League’s mandate has been 
broadened significantly since the early 1990s.  Nowadays, the CYL administers 
national programmes on graduate employment, entrepreneurship, youth psychology 
and welfare, charities, sports and recreation, environmental conservation etc. (Wang 
and Zhao, 2009; Xi and Liu, 2009). Individually driven initiatives have also increased 
the League’s activities, such as with the creation of the China Youth Development 
Foundation by Xu Yongguang, which established the biggest Chinese charity, the 
CYL-sponsored Project Hope (希望工程). Still, League cadres and educators press 
for more inclusive patterns of work (Zou, 2008), innovation in theory and practice 
(Li, 2008; Fu, 2008), greater representation of young people’s opinions and interests 
(Min, 2004), and are critical of initiatives that involve fanfare but no substance 
(Zheng, 2008).  
The challenges involved in “keeping the party assured, [and] the youth 
satisfied” in the reform era are similar to those faced by the Workers Union (ACFTU) 
and the Women’s Federation (ACWF). China’s mass organizations (MOs) are under 
the pressure of often-conflicting demands from the Party and society, what has been 
described as a “social nutcracker” (White et al,1996: 45). They are at the forefront of 
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state-society relations due to their extensive organizational presence and their 
mandate to act as channels of the regime’s communication with different social 
groups. The Party expects from MOs to cultivate support for its developmental 
policies, and partly address the social issues and demands that these policies have 
created. Cadres have responded by redefining and expanding their mandate. 
Researchers have recorded many instances of cadres organizing projects promoting 
women’s rights (Howell, 2000; Jin, 2001; Chow, Zhang and Wang, 2004), assisting 
workers in industrial negotiations and welfare demands (Howell, 1998; Chan, 2000; 
Ogden, 2000), and introducing a disabled-assistance agenda at the work of the 
national and local governments (Kohrman, 2005). The mandate and impetus for more 
responsiveness by cadres exists, but ultimately it is the interplay between structural 
constraints and agency in each particular case that determines the outcome. 
Consequently, despite many important ACWF initiatives in the central and local 
levels (Hershatter, 2004; Chow, Zhang and Wang, 2004; Gao, 2011; Angeloff and 
Lieber, 2012), success is compromised by CCP patriarchy and an economic model 
that has created structural limitations and disadvantages for women’s rights. 
Similarly, the ability of Unions to become more responsive to workers and maintain 
industrial peace differs between localities, sectors and types of enterprises and relies 
greatly on the commitment and skills of individual Union cadres (Chan, 2000; Zhu 
and Chan, 2005; Howell, 2006).  
The League faces a similar contradiction of having to increase its 
responsiveness to students without changing its relation to the Party. This paper will 
appraise the League’s effectiveness in doing so by examining its work on campus. 
Particular attention will be paid to the structural constraints that League cadres face 
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and the incapacitating effect that their generationally, academically and politically 
junior position has on their ability to “keep the youth satisfied”.  
 
Findings and methodology 
 
The following pages examine the League-student interaction combining the 
perspectives of both sides. Regarding the former, all the CYL organizations visited 
exhibited common low capacity to engage with students in a more responsive manner 
as both leading and ordinary (student) cadres face important disincentives and 
obstacles in renewing the League’s work on campus. The local CYL committee 
leaders are university employees and Party committee members, thus their work 
priorities reflect the CCP cadre evaluation criteria: party recruitment and political 
work measured in numbers and frequency of meetings and activities. CYL committee 
leaders have little incentive to experiment with new work patterns that may divert 
focus from core political functions. Student cadres on the other hand, could be agents 
of renewal, yet they are integrated in a very unfavourable manner in the academic, 
generational and political hierarchies present on campus, a situation that limits their 
initiative and scope for autonomous action.  
Further, the CYL on campus lacks its own resources, while its work priorities 
and majority of activities are directed to areas unrelated to student welfare, as the 
League is mainly preoccupied with the political and administrative tasks assigned by 
the Party committee and school authorities. When the League is involved in student 
affairs it is always from a junior, subordinate position. The League occasionally 
assists school authorities in organizing training activities, such as interview skills for 
students, but it has no autonomous role in student welfare. Even its social and 
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volunteer activities pursue a Lei Feng-styled didactic agenda with little appeal to 
students. In addition, the CYL in its interaction with student societies assumes the role 
of the supervisory and regulating arm of the Party committee, thereby strengthening 
its identity as a party agency rather than a youth organization, and limiting the 
potential of socializing its cadres with new methods of work and ways to engage 
students. With very little space for autonomous activities, political and administrative 
matters dominate the League’s agenda and frontline interaction with students, thereby 
augmenting the problem of its “relevance”. The paper records isolated initiatives for 
pro-youth action and instances of responsiveness but also that the impetus for their 
institutionalization is low. 
This study also discusses the findings of surveys conducted on campuses in 
Beijing and Zhejiang. The League is trying to expand its involvement in areas 
relevant to students, but according to the surveys, students remain sceptical regarding 
its capacity for responsiveness and require more attention to their interests and needs. 
The League maintains a form of engagement with students that is largely ceremonial 
and passive. The surveys record an apathetic and cynical stance to CYL processes as 
well as critical attitudes to the League’s claim to represent student interests. 
Ultimately, the League’s formal and bureaucratic work patterns discourage 
participation. 
The choice of urban and rural locations where fieldwork was conducted aimed 
at assessing the CYL’s work in rather favourable economic and social conditions 
where material constraints did not incapacitate campus-based organizations. The 
qualitative data for this study was collected from an elite comprehensive university 
(CU1) and two specialised universities (SU1 and SU2) in Beijing, a vocational study 
college (ZJ1) and a technical university (ZJ2) in Zhejiang province, and include semi-
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structured, in-depth interviews with CYL cadres1, personal observation during visits 
on the campuses, and the collection of organizational documentation on activities and 
work reports. Opinion surveys were carried out in the institutions CU1, SU2 and ZJ1.  
The paper will begin with an examination of the League’s membership, cadreship and 
activities on campus. It will then continue with a discussion of the survey data on 
student participation in the League. 
 
Joining the League 
 
What is the meaning of being a League member? Official rhetoric echoes 
traditional paternalistic attitudes towards young people, emphasizing their presumed 
“duties” to party and nation. The CYL’s discourse emphasizes its role as a “school of 
communism”, as a “reserve force of the party” and as an organization whose members 
need to be morally instructed and politically groomed (Fu and Yang, 2001; Yang, 
2009). Throughout this paper it will be argued that the League has operationalized the 
concept of “youth” as equivalent to “junior” in all aspects of its work. The first, and 
perhaps most discernible, expression of this is the overtly arbitrary age range of 
membership, from 15 to 28 years old, grouping together adolescents with young 
professionals, whose only commonality is their “junior” political status. The CYL’s 
treatment of its members as “advanced” yet “junior” individuals directs the majority 
of its work to preparation for CCP membership, which remains the ultimate 
expression of political maturity. The notion of League membership as a junior 
political condition, informs virtually all aspects of the League’s organisational life, 
hindering its ability to develop effective pro-constituency work on campus and 
beyond. 
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Standard entrance into the CYL starts at the age of 15 and involves the 
following criteria: 1) achievement in school, 2) correct thinking (expressed mainly 
through the application essay), and 3) proper behaviour towards teachers and fellow 
students. Initially a small group of students enters the League (around 3 percent) and 
increases progressively in the subsequent years. By the senior 3rd grade the large 
majority of students in schools in urban centres are already members, unless someone 
is not willing to join or, as a former secondary school teacher and league cadre 
explained, a student is “really backwards” (太落后). (Interview 1) In the countryside 
League membership is more exclusive (Interviews 2 and 3), an indication of the 
CCP’s preference for urbanites. The very formalistic application process (Yang, 2009: 
273), is also indicative of the notion of juniority embedded in the League’s discourse: 
a ‘school’, an ‘aide’, an organization of individuals that need to raise their political 
consciousness, abilities and skills. For example, an application essay reads as follows:  
I am an ordinary young person and as every other youth, I have ideals and 
aspirations, yearning for a better future, but I need to have a guiding light, and the 
League is a navigation mark on the road ahead (…) The Chinese Communist Youth 
League is the mass organization of advanced youth, the school of communism, the 
CCP's powerful aide. The League was personally built and nurtured by the great 
leader Chairman Mao (…) [League members] should train themselves to raise their 
socialist consciousness; become educated workers; love the motherland; be true to 
the people; have knowledge, discipline and a robust body; be hard-working, 
courageous, vibrant (…)  
 
An applicant is formally accepted after a background evaluation and the 
completion of a probation period that can last from six months to one year, during 
which they are monitored through attendance in CYL sessions, seminars, school 
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events and volunteer activities. Joining the League does not affect one’s life in high 
school nor does it provide any material or other benefits. “Outstanding” (优秀) 
members may still get free or easier access to university departments with Party 
oriented subjects, such as Marxism, but the already low demand for these subjects 
renders this motive of little importance. (Interviews 2 and 4) Nowadays, non-
membership is not a stigma, nor is it accompanied by sanctions. When asked to reflect 
on their decision to join the League, the interviewees often noted that at this age one 
perceives the passage from being a Young Pioneer (the CCP’s organisation for 
children) to the League as an honour (荣誉). Joining the League is “something you do 
at school”, an indication that you grew up, a ritual not easily distinguished from the 
education system and other “rites of passage” in one’s road to adulthood. (Interviews 
1, 5, 6) 
In university, the most straightforward co-optation function of the CYL is the 
automatic membership offered to first year students following the completion of a 
short period of military training (军训). Junxun was initiated after the student uprising 
of 1989 in an attempt to instil patriotism (爱国家) and ‘love for the Party’ (爱党) in 
the new generation of students (Rosen, 1993: 317-319). Junxun is compulsory for all 
freshmen, League members and non-members alike, and it includes basic and not 
physically or otherwise demanding military drills, marching and political lectures. 
The duration of junxun varies among schools and it ranges from one to four weeks. 
Both automatic membership and the junxun aim at co-opting the largest number of 
students possible by indoctrinating them as junior participants in the formal political 
process and opening the road to Party membership. 
League membership for university students is not accompanied by any 
particular benefits and its importance for later employment in the wider public sector 
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is relevant only to the degree that it is supportive for the Party enrolment process. The 
interviewees, when asked about the motives for someone to join the League, pointed 
out to career (“前途”, “生涯”) and conformity concerns (“是一个传统”, “没有实际
的意义”), while a minority also mentioned patriotism and serving society as reasons. 
The survey results (figure 1) support the findings of the interviews, demonstrating 
pragmatic and conformist attitudes (responses 1 and 2) as significantly more common 
than idealistic reasons (3 and 4). Interestingly, joining for the “prestige” (response 5) 
associated with League membership, a main motive for high school students, is faring 
relatively low in university. In the past, non-membership would be considered a 
politically deviant choice, minimising one’s chances for Party membership and career 





Figure 1: What is the main motive for young people joining the League? 
Interestingly, if we compare the students’ motives for joining the CYL to those for 
Party membership2 (figure 2), in both cases only a minority demonstrated ideological 





Figure 2: Is joining the Party important to you? 
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Overall, becoming a League member in reformist China is a formalistic 
process that reproduces the notion of ‘youth’ as a politically junior identity. It is more 
accurate to say that Chinese university students decide whether to decline League 
membership rather than whether to join, and most choose to do so as a result of 
conformity-related and utilitarian considerations. In fact, demands for compulsory 
participation to League ceremonies and activities that are an integral part of life in 
high school, are reduced significantly in frequency and intensity in university, where 
apart from paying the League fee, membership can be rather nominal.  
  
Grassroots League committees and cadres 
 
The League’s organization on campus resembles closely that of a danwei 
Party committee and follows the academic structure, from class and grade (班级, 年
级) to the university level. In the latter, the League committee is organised in different 
offices/departments, which despite slight variations in their titles between colleges, 
perform the following major tasks: 1) the Organisation Department (组织部), which 
is in charge of personnel files and issues, i.e. recommending and selecting cadres and 
leaders and monitoring the Party application process, 2) the Propaganda Department (
宣传部), in charge of the League’s newspaper, online and paper publications, posters, 
and announcements, 3) the Societies Department (社团部), which administers and 
monitors Student Societies, 4) the Volunteer’s Department (志愿者部), essentially in 
charge of  student mobilisation, and finally 5) an Activities Department (活动部 or 文
化体育部). CU1 in Beijing also has a General Department (综合部) to coordinate 
League work across school, and an office for young researchers and graduate students 
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(Document 1). The SU1 committee has a public relations department (外联部) to 
attract donations for League activities. In large institutions, the offices are replicated 
in the college/faculty level where a League sub-committee (分团委 ) exists. 
(Interviews 7, 8, 9, 10)  
 
The “laoshi”  
A common characteristic in all universities visited was the central position of 
the ‘teacher’, laoshi (老师), in the League hierarchy. The term laoshi, is used by 
students as an honorific form of addressing academic and administrative personnel. In 
the League, the term refers mainly to teachers (and occasionally administrators) who 
occupy leading positions (Secretary, Vice-Secretary) of CYL committees (团委). 
These individuals are members of the corresponding Party committee who have 
passed the age limit of 28, and their posts are unpaid and part-time. The number of 
full-time League cadres varies greatly among different universities; for example, in 
CU1 in Beijing there are 6 full-time cadres, while in ZJ2 there is none. The average of 
full-time cadres is 1 to 2 per campus, usually the university secretary and vice-
secretary. Their salaries are paid by the university according to the original contract of 
employment (teaching or administration).  
Internally, the central position of the laoshi is explained by their role in 
administering the CCP membership preparatory process on campus -- the League’s 
core political function. Their double authority as teachers and CCP committee, in 
conjunction with a lack of objective criteria that characterises the regulations for 
cadre promotion, work assignment and awards 3 , create fertile conditions for 
favouritism.  Indeed, interviewees often mentioned the impression (印象) a student 
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gives to the laoshi as a more important element for distributing awards and work 
allocations than measurable criteria like GPA4. 
Apart from favouritism, the central position of teachers also allows the 
Michelsian phenomenon of vested interests resulting in goal displacement to appear. 
The laoshi, a traditionally respected and unified body of authority in the eyes of 
students (Liu, 2006: 155), often pursue their own agendas in a way that even obstructs 
the routine function of the League. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is 
their ability to manipulate the organisation for careerist reasons and engage in ‘turf’ 
wars. In SU1, after the position of the university League secretary became vacant, two 
teachers with previously unresolved personal differences and common career targets 
competed behind the scenes bitterly to assume it. A CYL secretary position is an 
opportunity to exhibit leadership skills and be considered for future promotion. The 
Solomontian solution of the university CCP committee was to assign one as the 
secretary and the other as the vice secretary. Although the secretary is in a higher 
position they are both appointed by and only answering to the Party Committee. Due 
to their unwillingness to cooperate, a classic turf war started that divided the League, 
the Student Union, Student Societies and, occasionally, students into two different 
camps. The secretary and the vice-secretary embargoed each other’s activities and 
used favors to gain student support, such as simplifying the setting-up of societies, 
approving activities and promising better grades. Eventually, after two years of 
infighting, they were both promoted to different posts in the university party 
administration. (Interviews 7 and 11) 
The central position of the laoshi also results in increased arbitrariness in CYL 
procedures. An SU2 cadre complained that due to lack of connections to the 
university League committee, the applications for activities from his department 
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either took too long to be processed and so deadlines were often missed, or they were 
rejected for no clear reason. To circumvent this problem, they submitted joint 
applications with departments that had better leverage with the university CYL 
secretary. Identical applications submitted in two different ways had opposing 
outcomes as the joint proposal was eventually accepted within a reasonable period of 
time (Interview 8).  
Overall, CYL leaders on campus are Party committee members who combine 
political and workplace authority and therefore control decision making within the 
organization. Their tenure is short (approximately 3-4 years) and serves as a stepping-
stone for higher posts in the Party. Leading cadres should be distinguished from 
ordinary cadres who are routinely recruited among students. 
 
Student cadres 
There are no consistently applied rules and procedures on student cadre 
recruitment. These range from “closed” processes in which students are approached 
by a laoshi and then are assigned cadreship, to open calls for interviews and elections 
among pre-selected candidates. In all campuses visited, interviewees explained that a 
student wishing to become a cadre “needs to be noticed” by the laoshi and go through 
a process that involves an interview and a trial period of usually one year. Selection 
usually takes place in the first two years of study. Student cadres occupy lower 
positions in the different levels of the League’s structure within the university (up to 
faculty vice-secretary), staffing its various offices and acting as assistants of the laoshi 
in charge. (Interviews 5, 12, 13,14) 
Why would a student choose to become a League cadre, especially if we take 
into consideration the heavy coursework and study load in a Chinese academic 
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institution? Interviewees sited three sets of potential benefits for student cadres, 
namely: Party membership; the prospect of career advancement; and opportunities for 
social life. Concerning the first, one of the main functions of the League is acting as a 
“school for communism”, preparing its members and cadres for Party membership. In 
this process student cadreship experience can be helpful for one’s Party entrance (入
党) review. Nowadays, however, as the Party is actively seeking to recruit “advanced 
youth”, Party membership is open to any student willing to go through the application 
process (Interviews 2 and 15). Secondly, although League cadreship is just one 
among various gateways to the Party, it is still considered by students as potentially 
helpful for a political-bureaucratic career. League cadreship experience can add some 
weight for job applications to state- owned enterprises (SOEs) and the wider public 
sector (for example media corporations), as equal to an internship. In addition, cadres 
with the proper qualifications and/or connections may work full time for local League 
committees. Particularly for those pursuing a career in the Party-state, various studies 
have revealed that the CYL can offer a fast-track (at least by Chinese standards) 
promotion path and a gateway to government administration (Kou and Tsai, 2014). 
The League also serves as a space where leadership networks and individual loyalties 
are formed (Bo, 2004). In provincial and sub-provincial levels, Kou Chien-Wen 
(2007) has shown that the League road to career advancement is becoming 
increasingly effective as evidenced by the large numbers of CYL cadres promoted to 
provincial Party secretary and vice secretary positions. Also a study on the benefits of 
participation in Beijing-backed youth organisations in Macau reached similar 
conclusions (Tam, 2008). Although it has been argued that “going the way up” 
through the Party road is losing importance in comparison to the more materially 
rewarding opportunities in the private sector (Rosen, 2004), the attractiveness of a job 
 20 
through the League-Party path should not be underestimated, especially under 
conditions of intensive competition in the job market.  
Finally, a third and more immediate reason for a student to become a cadre is 
social life. The caricature of a cadre as a bureaucrat in a grey office rubber stamping 
documents may not be very far from reality, as the majority of League cadres 
described their work as an “office job”, comprised mainly of administrative duties. 
Indeed, in all campuses surveyed, the League was considered a more formal and less 
exciting organisation to get involved with in comparison to the Student Union and 
Student Societies -another indication of the League’s wider challenge of remaining 
relevant by updating its form and substance of work. However, a student cadre has 
opportunities to socialise with their colleagues and, occasionally, occupy themselves 
with creative and entertaining activities. The teamwork involved even in political 
tasks, offers pleasant breaks from the solitude of long study hours in the library and is 
a motive for participation. To conclude, student cadres are chosen mainly through the 
subjective criteria of League secretaries and their role is to assist the latter. The 
context in which they operate allows little space for initiative, and this, as we will 




The confined geography of the Chinese university, with its introvert and 
orderly campus life creates favourable conditions for the League’s engagement with 
its members. Nonetheless, the CYL’s student ‘constituency’ is more diverse than 
ever. Chinese students are fashion and trend conscious, follow mainstream and 
various youth subcultures, seek recreation, and organize their own societies. In this 
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context, the League attempts to remain relevant to students through its activities and 
services. The range of League activities on campus mirrors the challenge of balancing 
a multi-faced identity as a junior Party bureaucracy and as an organisation seeking to 
engage and be responsive to students. Despite their multiple nature, for analytical 
reasons the League’s activities are here categorised in three groups: 1) political, 2) 
student oriented, 3) volunteer.  
 
Political work 
The CYL’s political work includes political study, propaganda activities, and 
the supervision of student organizations on campus. The first is mainly addressed to 
CCP membership applicants and takes the form of policy document group study and 
talks by Party cadres5. Their frequency varies among institutions, approximately once 
a month for a study session and once or twice a semester for a lecture, and 
participation is usually obligatory for applicants. Propaganda activities include public 
singing of patriotic songs and flag-raising ceremonies that are usually on a voluntary 
basis6, as well as the dissemination of political messages through posters, banners, the 
university League newspaper and internet channels. 
The CYL’s political tasks also include the supervision of campus 
organisations, notably the Student Union and student societies, acting as the 
incorporating mechanism of the Party. It should be noted that the presence of these 
organizations creates conditions of competition for the League to appeal to students 
and involve them in its activities.   
From the university down to the class level the Student Union is placed under 
the “leadership” (领导) or “guidance” (指导) of the CYL, terms which refer to a 
relationship of dependency7. The League controls the Union either by involving it in 
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political activities (as in CU1), or through an additional “coordinating” office (called 
团学联 in SU2), or even by completely taking over its daily work (the case of ZJ2). 
The Union organizes independently recreational activities and cadres have described 
their work as creative, active and lively, whereas League work is regarded as formal, 
political and monotonous 8  (Interviews 6, 16, 17, 18). In addition, SU cadre 
appointments and activities at each level require permission by the corresponding 
League level secretary, a process that is not standardised and quite often depends on 
the arbitrary decision of an individual9.   
Student Societies (SSoc) are part of an expanding associational space (195 in 
CU1 and 42 in ZJ1) that the state wishes to control, and the League has assumed the 
responsibility of monitoring, regulating and reporting on their activities. The 
regulatory framework in place for the establishment and supervision of student 
societies resembles the 1998 “Regulations for registration and management of social 
organisations” (Pei, 1998; Ma, 2002) and has been described by students as “complex 
and time-consuming” (复杂费时). Despite local variations, League committees have 
specialised departments10  (学生社团部门 , or 社团工作部门) that supervise the 
establishment, growth and activities of societies. In addition, the League co-opts their 
organizers by involving them in training sessions and discussion ‘salons’. Every year 
societies recruit new members and must submit an annual report on membership and 
activities to the League in order to maintain their right to operate. (Interviews 10, 17, 
19, 20) 
 The student union and societies undermine the CYL’s appeal to students in 
two ways. First, they accentuate the problem of the League’s ‘relevance’ as they offer 
an alternative for more diverse and meaningful activities than the CYL’s formalistic 
organizational life. Secondly, their presence reinforces the CYL’s dependency to the 
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CCP as League organizations assume supervisory duties on its behalf. As a result, 
rather than creating conditions for renewal through competition and interaction with 
organizations that are closer to student interests and preferences, the CYL’s position 
vis-à-vis the students union and societies sustains its existing patterns of work as an 
agent of the Party. 
Not surprisingly, the CYL’s political work is the least popular among students 
and student cadres alike (also Liu, 2006: 148). The informal categorization of events 
by some interviewees is very characteristic in this regard. One explained that “in the 
League we have the leadership (领导性) activities and those that students like (学生
喜欢的)” (Interview 21), and another distinguished between the political activities 
that characterized as a “duty” (任务) from those that are “fun” (快乐) (Interview 11). 
Cadres complained repeatedly about a lack of balance in the League’s work, with 
political and administration duties leaving little time for other type of activities. 
Indeed, the political calendar of the year is heavy. On May 1st, May 4th, October 1st  
etc.11, League cadres organise ceremonies and parades. In addition, they participate in 
routine political meetings, CCP membership preparation sessions, and carry out the 
miscellaneous chores ordered by the Party committee. If one also considers the heavy 
academic workload with its four examination periods annually, there is limited time 
and energy left for cadres to engage in non-political work. 
 
“Serving the students” 
Cadres mentioned sporadic examples of pro-student initiatives. At SU1, cadres 
reported freshers’ concerns about a module that was subsequently revised and 
simplified as well as problems with hot water in the students’ dormitories and 
accessibility to the campus (Interviews 13 and 22). In CU1 and SU2 the League 
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participates in the committee responsible for monitoring the catering services offered 
by the canteen (食堂委员会 ), collecting student feedback and negotiating with 
management to lower prices and improve quality12. In CU1, the League and the 
Union jointly proposed that a building designated for demolition should be turned into 
an activity centre for student societies instead of administration offices (Interview 
19). Similarly, in SU1, League cadres transferred students’ demands for a new, 
bigger library building (Interview 8), while in ZJ1 they achieved the extension of the 
school’s infirmary operating hours. Also in ZJ1, cadres mentioned that the League 
passed student feedback on to university authorities regarding sports facilities, 
internet speed and mobile phone signal on campus (Interview 23). League committees 
are also involved in study support for weak students (Interviews 7 and 24). These 
examples demonstrate that the bottom-up impetus for responsiveness exists and 
cadres are generally sympathetic to student demands. However, the CYL’s work 
priorities limit the commitment, ability and time available of cadres to routinely carry 
out representative roles. This is equally evident in the League’s non-political 
activities. 
The League’s student-oriented activities are typically organized into three 
areas: registry, careers services, sports and recreation. Firstly, the League is in charge 
of student affairs offices that also offer registry services with cadres performing 
secretarial duties. In all universities visited, the same space was also used as the 
headquarters of League committees and the volunteers. The office provides 
applications for the formation of Student Societies and activities, issues student 
certificates for various purposes13 and collects applications for school events. Also 
every September, League cadres are actively involved in enrolment and induction. 
The League is at an advantageous position to provide registry-style services due to its 
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access to student files and the free labour of cadres. What is more, the administration 
of student affairs serves political purposes. At the time of fieldwork, the CU1 League 
Organisation Office was about to launch a new service, providing certified records of 
extra-curricular activities for students, such as volunteer work, membership in 
organisations and awards received, to be used in applications for further study or 
employment upon graduation. The cadre in charge commented that this was a 
response to student demand (Interview 19) but, of course, the self-reporting of extra-
curricular and extra-League activities involved in certification also expands the 
committee’s monitoring capacity.   
A second area of student-oriented activities is employment, the main concern 
of Chinese graduates today. The League has turned much of its attention to this field 
by administering national initiatives, notably the ‘Go West’ Program (西部计划), 
microfinance schemes for rural youth and job fairs for graduates, including projects 
organised by local governments (Wang and Zhao, 2009; Xi and Liu, 2009) . On 
campus, CYL committees are involved in skills-enhancement and job-search strategy 
seminars (writing a CV and interview preparation), internship programs, and “career 
days”. Often, such events are organized by the university/college or local 
governments with the League assisting in administration14.  
A third category of student-oriented activities is recreation, which includes 
singing contests, parties, museum visits, sports competitions, cultural festivals and 
excursions. As a rule of thumb, the League carries out more formal events and the 
Student Union focuses on entertainment. As one League cadre described it: “the SU 
activities are of [a] casual (随便) nature while those organised by the League are 
more serious, have deeper meaning and are quite formal” (Interview 12). However, 
in order to appeal to students, university League also run recreational activities 
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independently or in collaboration with other organisations, such as the Student Union 
and the Women’s Federation. At college/university level such activities follow a 
minimum Party protocol, blending political ceremony -even a “light” version of it- 
with “fun”15. In general, student-oriented activities are infrequent and as we will see 




From a Western perspective, “volunteerism” (志愿注意 ) in China is 
ambiguous due to the central role of the state (Ma, 2006; Hustinx, Handy and Cnaan, 
2012) and the inclusion of activities not traditionally associated with the term16. On 
campus, apart from mobilization for large-scale events such as the 2008 Olympics and 
the 2010 EXPO, volunteerism includes charity and blood donation drives, visits to 
nursing homes and migrant schools, cleaning of public spaces, participation in 
environmental projects, AIDS and birth control awareness campaigns17. Can this type 
of volunteerism transform the League’s priorities and functions, similarly to the 
ACWF that delineated a distinct area of social work in women’s rights? 
Unfortunately, the League’s volunteer activities are organized in a top-down fashion, 
serving didactic rather than social purposes, and are implemented in a fragmented 
manner. 
Volunteer activities are directed by the CCP committee, the university or the 
local government. They are on the “must-do” list of a university League organization 
and are reported in annual reviews. Although this guarantees that such activities will 
take place, their effectiveness depends on the degree of ingenuity, expertise and 
dedication of cadres. More often than not, these requirements are not met and 
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grassroots committees organise activities rather perfunctorily, without a clear purpose. 
In one indicative case in Beijing, the League Committee cleans the city’s botanical 
gardens on an annual basis, despite the fact there is no apparent need for it as its 
premises are cared for daily by the gardens’ staff. Similar cleaning drives take place 
on campuses throughout the country, demonstrating the participants’ selflessness 
rather than serving hygienic purposes, as universities have sanitation personnel on 
site.  
Overall, League volunteerism promotes a Lei Feng-fashioned altruism and the 
notion of “serving the people” in general, rather than a particular constituency. This 
normative context emphasizes the educational value for volunteers, but neglects 
making an actual and meaningful contribution. As a result, local campus branches do 
not develop long-term projects that would require some form of specialization and 
commitment of resources and time. Instead, they are involved in unsustainable 
projects with little impact. Finally, League committees on different campuses 
maintain remarkably low levels of communication with each other and with social 
organizations. The League occasionally cooperates with state-sponsored 
organizations, such as the Red Cross Committee, but even such examples are rare 
(Interviews 12, 17, 25). The CYL interacts almost entirely with Party and university 
authorities as a junior partner that can offer free labour and a youthful outlook to 
events. In conclusion, the form of the League’s voluntary work on campus and the 
processes followed are not an indication of the local League organisations’ greater 
autonomy, but rather the opposite. 
 
The view from below: the League’s evaluation by students 
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The remaining pages of this paper will analyze the students’ views on the 
CYL’s performance on campus as recorded in surveys conducted in three locations. It 
will begin with the findings on the League’s organizational life and student 
participation and will conclude with an evaluation of the League’s involvement in 
student welfare and its degree of responsiveness. 
 
Organizational life and participation 
Elections on campus exist only at the grassroots-level for the branch (class) 
secretary, who represents their class in the departmental League meeting. The position 
of the secretary is open annually for election among CYL members but, as discussed 
earlier, it involves interference of the teacher in charge, which may take the form of 
candidate pre-selection, or even open support for a nominee. When asked to comment 
on the best manner to select cadres (figure 3), the majority of respondents chose 
elections as the most preferred process, either without any interference by the laoshi, 
or involving a post-election ratification. The view that a more “wise” input is 
necessary was often recorded during the interviews, perhaps explained as the habitual 
effect of long-term socialization with the CCP’s discourse and top-down processes. 
[FIGURE 3] 
Still, the surveys demonstrated that students wish to have a say in the selection 
of branch secretary and are critical to appointments behind closed doors. Participation 
of students in grass-roots level elections for League branch secretaries is relatively 
high (CU1 48.9%, SU2 71.7%, ZJ1: 74.3%), as it takes place during lecture hours 
when the majority of League members are present. When students were also asked if 
they would participate in direct League cadre elections (at any level) should they be 
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given this opportunity, results were similarly high (sum of responses “yes I will” and 
“probably I will” CU1: 61.4%, SU1:76.3% and ZJ1:84%).  
In an organisation where cadre promotion depends on decisions made at 
higher levels, accountability to the base is weak. Grassroots cadres are rewarded not 
through re-election but through appointment in the departmental or university level 
League Committees. In theory, cadre accountability is assessed through reports to the 
members of the branch and peer evaluation. Provisions for transparency in League 
affairs and consultation with members are in place; however, students exhibited a 
wide lack of knowledge of these processes (table 1 answer: “I don’t know” = DK). 
Even when moving from the more outward CU1 institution towards the more isolated 
ZJ1, which is located in a remote, less urbanized area, with a more introvert school 
life, the responses indicating a lack of awareness concerning processes and criteria 
that should be met, remained high, while in the case of the institutions visited in 
Beijing the combined “No” and “I don’t’ know” answers were always in the majority. 
[TABLE 1] 
Regarding participation, table 2 shows that in all universities surveyed, around 
one third of students chose to abstain completely from the League’s activities from 
the first day and throughout their studies18. Data on participation frequency identifies 
a core minority group of “loyal” students (2-3 out of 10) that takes part at least once a 
month, while for the rest frequency ranges from once every three months to two 
years. It is important to note that the difference between the two Beijing-based 
institutions and ZJ1 is considerable as the latter’s remote location and small size 
enable its League organization to mobilize students more frequently. 
[TABLE 2] 
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The online attitudes of respondents revealed a similar pattern. Students were 
asked to comment on university League websites. The results exhibited an 
unexpectedly high proportion of students that had never visited the CYL website 
(CU1 81.5% and SU1 67.6%), with corresponding negative perceptions regarding its 
content (80.9% and 73.7% respectively). Further questions on the frequency of visits 
revealed that only 4.9% of students in the two universities accessed the website at 
least once a week, and 12.8% and 21.8% respectively at least once a month. The two 
websites contain practical information on student affairs (student activities, forms for 
student society registration, Party membership application, announcements for 
training, etc.). 
The survey attempted to identify the extent to which the participation of 
students in League activities corresponds to preferences and perceived usefulness. 
Table 3 compares League activities students participate in, to those they prefer and 
perceive as useful. Political study sessions and moral education classes, which are 
obligatory for those wishing to pursue Party membership, drain much of the cadres’ 
time and energy. These political activities are less welcomed and perceived as less 
useful by students. This is more evident in CU1 (comparing the 26.1 percent 
participation rate to a mere 4.4 percent preference and 7.9 percent usefulness 
perception) and SU2, but also in ZJ1, the difference is considerable. 
[TABLE 3] 
Lack of correspondence between actual participation and preference or 
usefulness exists in almost all categories of activities, with the exception of cultural 
and recreational events that the CYL usually co-organises with other organisations on 
campus. As argued also in qualitative terms, the organisation’s political priorities 
divert time and resources from activities that are more relevant to student interests and 
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needs. Job-hunting training offers an example of a central policy priority that is only 
partially implemented by the League as a result of its uneven distribution of resources 
and time. The relatively low participation in job-hunting skills training is not due to a 
lack of demand; in fact in terms of preference and usefulness these events rate quite 
high. This disparity is explained by the relatively small supply of activities in this area 
by an organisation that has other priorities in its day-to-day work.  
 
The League in student welfare and representation  
Regarding the League’s ability to intervene, promote and solve study and campus life 
related issues the proportion of students who answered “very useful” and “somehow 
useful” was low in the Beijing-based academic establishments. The evaluation of the 
League improved in the Zhejiang vocational school, where the League and the 
Student Union act as one unit. For comparison, respondents were also asked to 
comment on the SU and Societies’ ability to assist them with the same issues. The 
Union has fewer resources available and it does not perform registry services as the 
League does. Furthermore, Union cadres described their work as of recreational 
nature, not as advocating on behalf of students. Nevertheless, the Student Union fared 
better than the League in terms of responsiveness in all campuses surveyed (combined 
“very useful” and “somehow useful” responses). 
[TABLE 4] 
Similarly, Student Societies were evaluated more positively than the League, 
with the exception of ZJ1 where setting up and running a society is restricted and their 
number is smaller. In Beijing, student societies do not carry a mandate for 
representation within the organisational system on campus, but by being less political 
and more oriented to student recreation and interests they are also perceived as more 
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helpful in dealing with study and student-life related issues. Interestingly, despite 
being in a politically stronger institutional position to serve its constituency, the 
evaluation of the League’s responsiveness is lower than organisations with little or no 
formal mandate and capacity to respond (table 4). Not surprisingly, only a very small 
percentage of students would turn to the League as their first choice if they required 
organisational backing and assistance. For the large majority of students in Beijing-
based academic establishments, and approximately half of the students at the Zhejiang 




The League sends representatives to the People’s Congresses and People’s 
Political Consultative Conferences, the two formal institutions that have the potential 
to function as representative bodies in all levels of government. Table 6 focuses on 
the League’s representative capacity towards the city and central governments. 
The number of students who strongly believe in the League’s representational 
capacity is quite low (4.2%, 4.5% and 6% respectively).  Negative responses are 
prevalent regarding the League’s representational role towards the city (CU1 64.1%, 
SU2 54.2%) and central governments (CU1: 58.8%, SU2: 47.1%), a finding also 
supported by the interviews. Apart from the various negative personal opinions that 
were expressed by students and recorded through interviews or personal observation, 
it is worth noting that not even a single interviewee could provide an example of 
youth policy/legislation proposed by the League that was implemented by city or 
central government authorities. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that an 
exceptionally high percentage of students in all universities surveyed agreed with the 
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statement “The CYL needs to strengthen its youth work,” (86.1%, 91.9% and 89.6%, 
respectively). 
[TABLE 6] 
Next, respondents were asked to evaluate the League’s performance on issues 
that affect them the most, identifying employment as the most important problem of 
their constituency (table 7). Of course, the League cannot solve the problem of 
unemployment; therefore, the question here concerns its role in assisting through 
training and skills programs, job fairs, internship placement schemes and other 
initiatives that the CYL is administering. 
[TABLE 7] 
 
The surveys revealed that only a small minority of students views the League 
as very effective in assisting young people to deal with the problem of graduate 
unemployment, the second area of work after politics where the CYL in all levels 
devotes much of its attention and resources. If we add the “somehow effective” 
responses, the overall percentage remains lower than 50%. Still, this rate is not low, 
demonstrating that the CYL has not failed to identify the main concern of its key 
constituency of students, who in turn recognize its efforts. But graduate 
unemployment is rising and the Chinese government’s plans, in which the CYL is 
involved, can only respond to it partially. As unemployment is a key factor affecting 
public attitudes towards government effectiveness, we can assume that student 
perceptions on the League’s contribution are going to be directly affected by the 
regime’s overall performance in this area. 
In conclusion, the final part of the survey invited respondents to provide views 
and suggestions. These responses were grouped in five categories as displayed in 
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table 8. Although the majority of students chose not to reply to this open-ended 
question, the comments collected sustain the overall picture that arises from the 
aforementioned qualitative and quantitative data. The responses showed that: 1) 
students call for more frequent and impactful activities (“carry out more meaningful 
activities”, “organize activities that are useful for the students” 19 ), 2) criticize 
formalism (“become more humane, not always judge according to formal standards”, 
“don’t be so red and single-minded”, “the League should not have the hypocritical 
behavior of doing things on the surface and only in words, but needs to do some 
practical work”20), 3) request that League cadres communicate more with students 
(“get to know the demands of young people, strengthen communication and 
understanding, change pattern and way of work”, “communicate more and reach the 
students, don’t be so capitalist” 21 ), 4) want more responsiveness to bottom-up 
demands (“listen to the opinions of the students, serve the students”, “represent the 
interests of members, respond with enthusiasm to demands” 22), and finally 5) ask for 
a more open, fair, transparent and inclusive style of work (“league affairs need to be 
open, fair and transparent”, “I hope that the league can enable more students to 
understand what this organization is and why it exists”, “For ordinary people the 
League keeps the door closed...let there be more light, being a member does not only 
mean paying the membership fee”23).  
[TABLE 8] 
To sum up, the surveys recorded student attitudes at the end of China’s 
‘golden decade’, a period of unprecedented wealth and political stability. Evidently, 
the antithetical dynamics of the “youth Party agency” and the “youth organization” 
are at play in every aspect of the League’s grass-roots representation work on campus, 
with the former being prevalent. Thus, despite recognizing the CYL’s efforts in the 
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sphere of employment, students remain critical of the processes followed and the 
degree of responsiveness attained. The result is a feeling of increasing disassociation 
with formal political life, which students in China share with their peers elsewhere. 
This disassociation currently takes the form of apathy expressed as passive 




The League’s pronounced commitment to “keeping the youth satisfied” cannot 
be dismissed as mere “Party talk” (党话).  The examination of the League’s work on 
campus demonstrates that the regime recognizes some of the wide and complex 
challenges students face today (especially with regards to employment), and realizes 
that cultivating political loyalty depends on responding to at least some of these 
issues. It also reveals, however, a particular combination of factors that prevents 
cadres from engaging with students in a more substantive and less formalistic manner. 
Dependence on the local CCP committee is the first factor which ensures that CYL’s 
tasks are largely defined through the regime’s political priorities. The corresponding 
Party committee controls cadre selection and promotion, finances, offices, materials 
and funds for specific activities, and this is translated to the Party’s strong ability to 
direct form, content and timing of League work.  
The literature on China’s mass organizations shows that social pressure often 
prompts cadres to take pro-constituency action and renegotiate dependency. However, 
League committees operate in a context of ‘juniority’ that further reduces autonomy 
and the prospect of bottom up cadre agency renewing the CYL’s interaction with 
students. League cadres on campus are embedded in academic and generational 
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hierarchies that inhibit their ability for pro-student action. They are placed in a 
position of institutional weakness to negotiate internally with the committee leaders, 
who, as university employees, occupy positions of multifaceted authority: political, 
academic, generational. Their short tenure and the absence of pro-student work norms 
further accentuate the impact of ‘juniority’, which prevents cadres from 
circumventing the context of dependence. Ultimately, dependence and juniority have 
a clear limiting effect on how cadres perceive their duties and role vis-à-vis their 
constituency. This is evident in the rather formalistic way the League communicates 
with young people, in its cold treatment of student societies, and in the many out-
dated norms and methods of work followed. Student views recorded in the surveys 
fall in line with the qualitative findings of this paper. 
The first implication of this investigation concerns the issue of the 
institutionalization of channels for representation and responsiveness as a means of 
cultivating legitimacy for the regime. Examining this aspect is crucial in order to 
understand the complex relationship between the state and students, especially since 
the effectiveness of alternative means of fostering support, notably by appealing to 
economic growth, nationalism, and offering a path to secure employment, are all 
conditioned by dynamics beyond the control of the League or, even the CCP. The 
alternative is to cultivate support through institutional responsiveness, by providing 
processes for meaningful and voluntary participation and specialized services. From 
this perspective, the regime’s front line youth organization does not provide 
institutional means where young people can resort to raise their issues and have 
reasonable expectations of an effective response. This investigation showed that at 
best, the League can sustain the passive participation of students who consider 
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conformity and docility as a more appealing option than a declared ‘exit’ from formal 
politics.  
As the League’s often-proclaimed aspiration to act as a channel for “keeping 
the youth satisfied” has yet to materialize, the regime is left with an unreliable 
mechanism for sustaining students engaged with formal politics in a manner that 
cultivates support to the regime and loyalty to its institutions. The CYL cannot absorb 
the impact of unforeseeable crises (in foreign policy, economic downturn or 
recession) and public perceptions on corruption, bad governance and inequality, to 
students’ tolerance or support for the regime. Ironically, despite the transformation of 
economic, political and societal contexts in the last 50 years, the socialization of 
China’s younger generations with the political system is still mediated through an 
institution that can do little more than mobilize “voluntary” labour in periods of 
stability. During the Cultural Revolution and the student protests of late 1980s the 
CYL was ineffective in lessening discontent and promoting loyalty to the CCP. 
Similarly today, the CYL’s low institutionalization of channels for representation and 
capacity for responsiveness means that tensions and grievances with the regime are 
unlikely to be diffused through institutional means. On the contrary, the League’s 
standing as a ceremonious and anachronistic political organization with weak ability 
for pro-constituency action is likely to further substantiate and popularize cynical 
attitudes among students towards the formal political process. 
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Table 1 – Does your League 







Responses (%): Yes No DK Yes No DK Yes No  DK 
1. Nomination of candidates from 
the members 
 
2. League affairs are 
open/transparent  
 
3.Cadres regularly submit reports on 
their work to the members  
 
4.Members are consulted before 
major decisions 
37.3   15    43.2    
 
 
35.5   13    47.1    
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Table 3 CYL activities 
that students… 
Replies (%)  
 
…participate in 
CU1    SU2    ZJ1 
 
…prefer  
CU1    SU2    ZJ1 
 
…consider useful 
CU1    SU2    ZJ1 
1.Professional skills  
 










15.7    14.3    23.2 
 
10.9    11.7    25.4 
 
20.1    28.5    34.3 
 
26.1    27.4    39.1 
 
46.5    51.2    42.5 
 
14.2    18.7    34.3 
29.5    32.9    38.5 
 
23.7    32.4    33.4 
 
35.6    38.1    42 
 
4.4      8.7      14.1 
 
66.8    71.2    72.1 
 
3.2      9.3      20.1 
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38.1    46.5    56.8 
 
19.5    20.6    20.3 
 
7.9      14.8    22.8 
 
36.4    36.9    30.5 
 




























1. No 37.5 31.2 30.3 
2. Yes 
Missing 
61.9            66.8            67.9 
.6                 2                 1.8 
 
-How often? 
1.At least once a month 
2.Once every 3 months 
3.Once every semester 
4.Once a year 








15.4 17.6 10 
16.3 12.6 9.3 
8.0 8.7 4.9 
2.4 2.5 0.9 





















Table 4 How useful are the 
following organisations in 
helping you with… 
Replies (%): 
      
    Study-related issues 
 
CU1          SU2          ZJ1 
 
Student life - related issues 
 





1. Very useful 
2. Somehow useful 
3. Not very useful 
4. Not useful at all  
Missing 















5.1                9                 13.1 
27.5              26.8            36.5 
41.2              44.6            35.6 
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31.6              34.3            29.7 
40.6              36.4            37.6 
17.5              15.1            19.7 
2.7                 2.4             3.1 
Table 5- If you require the assistance of an organisation to deal 











1. Yes I will, it is my first choice 4.2 4.4 6 
 
























Table 6- Beyond the 
campus 
                CU1                           SU2                          ZJ1 
Replies (%): 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
The CYL can 
effectively represent 
my interests, opinions 
& demands towards 
the central government 
5.7 33.8 42.9 15.9 16.4 35 35.1 12 NA NA NA NA 
The CYL can 
effectively represent 
my interests, opinions 
& demands towards 
the city government 
4.8 29.8 47.9 16.2 12.3 31.8 40.8 13.4 NA NA NA NA 
The CYL needs to 
strengthen youth work 
27.3 58.8 10.1 2.4 45 46.9 5.4 1.1 46 43.6 8.6 .7 





Table 7 What is the most important problem that university 











Finding a job 78.4 82.4 88 
Opportunities for further education 9.2 9 6 
Marriage 2.4 2.7 .4 
Protection of their rights 5.4 3.5 2.6 
Other 3.9 1.3 2.2 
Missing .6 1.3 .9 
- How effective is the League in helping young people deal 
with the problem of finding a job?  
   
Very Effective 5.4 11.3 10.8 
Somehow effective 39.4 30.2 35.4 
Not very effective 



















Increase number and improve content of activities  24 48 109 
 
































                                                        
1 The interviewees wished to remain anonymous. Their role in the League, occupation and interview 
date are recorded here under References. 
2 This question was not included in the Zhejiang survey due to considerations about the local CYL 
committee’s approval. 
3  A document that was made available to the author by an SU2 League cadre, explained the 
Requirements for League awards. From a total of 12 different criteria referring to three different 
awards only one was objectively measured, academic performance (Document 3) 
4 In two instances, award holders explained that common birthplace with a teacher or the student’s 
family connections can be important factors. 
5  Lectures on Falun Gong, “terrorism”, and the 2008 ethnic conflict had been carried out in all 
universities visited. The author also attended a lecture on the CCP’s resilience in comparison to other 
communist parties.  
6 ZJ1 college in Zhejiang has a flag raising ceremony once every two weeks when participation is 
obligatory 
7 Characteristically, the National Student Union is located in the CYL headquarters in Number 10, 
Qianmen Dongdajie, Beijing 
8 In the two colleges where data was made available (SU1, ZJ1), applications for Union cadreship 
outnumbered those for the League, 4 to 1 and 7 to 3 respectively. 
9 In SU1 a Union cadre complained that because of the relatively small size of his department the 
teacher in charge repeatedly blocked applications for recreational activities. 
10 ZJ1 has the College Societies Working Committee (学园社工委) and ZJ2 has formed a Student 
Associations Committee that is directly subordinated to the Party Committee. 
11 League branches also celebrate June 1st (Children’s Day) and July 1st (founding of the CCP). 
12 This is an area of frequent tension between students and the management of canteens (Interview 14) 
13 For instance, the CYL office in CU1 provided the author with a student certificate to facilitate 
fieldwork in the universities visited. 
14  ZJ1 cadres mentioned the Entrepreneurship Institute (创业园) as an example of the League’s 
involvement in graduate employment, a project run and funded by the School.  
15 In ZJ1, a pop dance event started with a performance based on the revolutionary movie “Song of 
Youth” (1959). 
16 “Volunteers” also include neighborhood committee patrols and security guards (保安). 
17 Interviewees mentioned that volunteers are involved in the system of online monitoring known as the 
Five Mao Party (五毛党).  
18 Surveys were held at the end of the academic year, so first year students had one year to participate 
in CYL events, therefore the result is not distorted by bias due to year of study. 
19 “多开展一些有意义的活动” (SU2), “多举办些对大学生有用的活动” (ZJ1), also: Organize more 
activities that attract people and are interesting, decrease formalistic activities – “多办吸引人的，有意
义的活动，少办形式主义的活动” (CU1).  
20 “应该更加的人性化,不要总是在形式上做文章” (ZJ1), “不要太红太专” (CU1), “团组织不要做
一些表面上，口头上的虚伪行动 ，作一些切合实际的工作” (ZJ1),  also: be less formalistic, do 
more practical work for the students – “少些形式主义,多为学生做些实事” (SU2). 
21 “了解青年需求，加强交流，理解，转变工作方式和方法” (CU1), “多与学生交流, 深入学生不
要太资本主义” (SU2), also: “communicate more with the students, understand and grasp their 
mainstream thinking and trends of behavior” – “深入学生群中,了解学生的思想主流,把握学生思想,
行为动向” (ZJ1). 
22 “多听学生意见。为同学们服务。” (CU1), “能够代表团员的利益,积极反映其要求” (SU2), also: 
“strengthen the work of serving youth, activate the enthusiasm of members”-“ 加强在服务青年方面
的作用,调动团员积极性” (ZJ1), “decrease bureaucratism”–“ 减少官僚主义” (CU1). 
23 “团务公开化,公正化” (SU2), “希望团组织能让大多数团员知道团组织是什么，它存在的意义” 
(ZJ1), “团组织对一般人而严总是关着大门的 (…) 希望其能阳光化一些,让我们不只成为只在交
团费上有意义的一员”(ZJ1). 
